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CLIMATE CHANGE’S FREE RIDER PROBLEM: WHY WE
MUST RELINQUISH FREEDOM TO BECOME FREE
NATALIE M. ROY*
We are faced with the fact that tomorrow is today. Over the
bleached bones and jumbled residues of numerous civiliza-
tions are written the pathetic words ‘Too Late.’
–Martin Luther King Jr., April 4, 19671
ABSTRACT
Despite the increasing urgency of climate change, countries con-
tinue to struggle to cooperate on even modest solutions. Of international
accords that are successfully ratified, agreed-upon commitments are mostly
hortatory and vague, succeeding only in engendering a fragmented, vol-
untary compliance scheme. Unsurprisingly, decades of tepid climate action
and procrastination have begotten a staggering emissions gap for the world
to close by 2030—requiring a collective greenhouse gas reduction of about
fifty percent to limit global warming to the 1.5°C benchmark. Yet, global
greenhouse emissions have generally risen, not fallen in the last decade,
with 2018 marking a record high despite pledges made in compliance
with the celebrated 2015 Paris Agreement. In short, international models
of climate cooperation thus far have descriptively been unequal to the
task of securing adequate global climate action. Once we recognize and
agree that global warming cannot go unaddressed, the conclusion follows
that change, perhaps of a radical nature, is required. This Article argues
that decades of insufficient international cooperation militate against
tweaking current models, and instead proposes a blueprint for a concrete,
market-driven compliance scheme that, importantly, would be operative
without a world government or divestment of individual sovereignty.2
* JD 2021, Columbia Law School. BA, Government and Global Studies 2016, Colby College.
1 Martin Luther King Jr., Address at the Clergy and Laity Concerned at Riverside Church
(Apr. 4, 1967).
2 To be sure, the solution proposed infra, would not, and could not, be implemented
tomorrow—international and domestic politics would forbid it, and this Article does not
suggest otherwise. Rather, this Article operates with the futuristic presupposition that
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INTRODUCTION
Since the late nineteenth century, largely as a result of anthropo-
genic greenhouse gas emissions, the planet’s average surface tempera-
ture has risen about 1°C.3 Consequent glacial and ice sheet melting has
the visible consequences from climate change have become sufficiently threatening to the
average world citizen so as to radically alter public opinion. With this in mind, the binding
framework proposed is simply meant to suggest one way to set the table for when world
leaders are prepared to meaningfully sit down. As this Article will later argue, current inter-
national law and institutions are ill-suited for the unprecedented levels of cooperation
climate action demands, and future solutions (even those proposed with the presupposed
urgency and earnestness) will continually fall prey to free riding absent a concrete
binding mechanism.
3 Climate Change: How Do We Know?, NASA [hereinafter How Do We Know?], https://cli
mate.nasa.gov/evidence/ [https://perma.cc/A5R4-3BRB] (last visited Mar. 10, 2021).
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contributed to an eight-inch rise in global sea levels in the last century,
with a nearly doubled rate of rise in the last two decades, increasing every
year.4 Upticks in the frequency and intensity of hurricanes have wrought
greater destruction to affected populations and abnormally devastating
fires have recently raged through California and Australia, exacerbated
by the hotter temperatures and dryer conditions.5 Since the Industrial
Revolution, ocean acidity has increased by about thirty percent, which,
in conjunction with hotter waters and pollution, threaten (further) mass
extinctions of our current marine biodiversity and human livelihoods.6
A recent report released by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (“IPCC”) warned that we have now nine years to limit global
warming to 1.5°C to mitigate our risk of hitting local and global tipping
points that would precipitate (further) permanent ecological collapse and
mass animal and plant extinctions.7 Failure to timely limit warming re-
portedly will have devastating impacts on our species as well, exposing
humanity to significantly increased risks of heat-related illness and mortal-
ity, vector borne diseases, extreme droughts and floods, and food insecu-
rity.8 More alarmingly, a long-term failure to address the crisis may have
4 Id. On top of threatening to swallow swathes of low-lying land entirely, rising sea levels
also put infrastructure at risk in coastline urban settings including, inter alia, roads, bridges,
subways, water supplies, oil and gas wells, power plants, sewage treatment plants, and
landfills. Rebecca Lindsey, Climate Change: Global Sea Level, NOAA (Aug. 14, 2020), https://
www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-climate/climate-change-global-sea-level
[https://perma.cc/JA5V-ZBXC].
5 Nerilie Abram, Australia’s Angry Summer: This Is What Climate Change Looks Like, SCI.
AM.(Dec. 31, 2019), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/australias-angry-sum
mer-this-is-what-climate-change-looks-like/ [https://perma.cc/YQA5-8CRK]; Jeff Berardelli,
How Climate Change Is Making Hurricanes More Dangerous, YALECLIMATECONNECTIONS
(July 8, 2019), https://www.yaleclimateconnections.org/2019/07/how-climate-change-is
-making-hurricanes-more-dangerous/ [https://perma.cc/2CNE-AKFF]; Haley Smith & Rong-
Gone Lin II, The Frightening Implications of California’s First Million-Acre Fire, L.A.TIMES
(Oct. 6, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-10-06/the-frightening-impli
cations-california-first-million-acre-wildfire [https://perma.cc/ZFC3-LSKP].
6 Ocean Acidification, NOAA, https://www.noaa.gov/education/resource-collections/ocean
-coasts-education-resources/ocean-acidification [https://perma.cc/GE9Z-QGLK] (Apr. 2020);
see also John C. Kunich, Losing Nemo: The Mass Extinction Now Threatening the World’s
Ocean Hotspots, 30 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 1 (2005).
7 See generally Global Warming of 1.5 °C, IPCC, https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/ [https://perma
.cc/RP3M-BVJG] (last visited Mar. 10, 2021).
8 Alan Buis, A Degree of Concern: Why Global Temperatures Matter, NASA (June 19, 2019),
https://climate.nasa.gov/news/2865/a-degree-of-concern-why-global-temperatures-matter/
[https://perma.cc/G6XJ-HJ2X]. Climate change will also have devastating impacts on in-
frastructure and the economy. If current greenhouse gas emissions do not change, extreme
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existential consequences for our species as scientists fear that enough heat
will trigger feedback loops in our ecosystems, such as the melting of the
world’s permafrost—estimated to store approximately 1,500 billion tons of
carbon (almost double the amount currently in the atmosphere)—thus kick-
starting irreversible, runaway climate cycles outside of human control.9
Part I of this Article offers a diagnosis for our collective failure
thus far to secure meaningful climate action. Part II argues that future
action will likely fail without concrete means to bind participating
countries to their climate commitments. Part III then provides a possible
solution to this problem by blueprinting a market-based binding mecha-
nism that could be appended to future climate agreements. The Article
concludes by exploring some potential shortfalls of this hypothetical solu-
tion. Even if the specific mechanism proposed herein does not gain traction,
I hope this Article helps energize our collective pursuit of solutions that
can meet the crisis at hand.
heat is projected to result in the loss of almost two billion labor hours in the agricultural,
construction, and other outdoor sectors by 2090 with attendant estimated lost wages of
$160 billion. Fourth National Climate Assessment Vol. II—Impacts, Risks, and Adapta-
tion in the United States: Report-in-Brief,U.S.GLOB.CHANGE RSCH.PROGRAM 1, 41 (2018),
https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/downloads/NCA4_Report-in-Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc
/4KPQ-7V6Q].
9 Renee Cho, Why Thawing Permafrost Matters, EARTHINST.COLUM.UNIV. (Jan. 11, 2018),
https://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2018/01/11/thawing-permafrost-matters/ [https://perma.cc
/UC84-ALD5]. In fact, a recent physics study suggests that climate change not only
represents an apocalyptic threat to humanity, but to any energy-intensive civilization,
concluding that unaddressed planetary feedback is a logical answer to the famous Fermi
Paradox. Adam Frank et al., The Anthropocene Generalized: Evolution of Exo-Civili-
zations and Their Planetary Feedback, 18 ASTROBIOLOGY 503 (2018); see also Seth D. Baum,
Is Humanity Doomed? Insights from Astrobiology, 2 ASTROBIOLOGY &SUSTAINABILITY 591
(2010). The “Fermi Paradox” is a paradox capturing the perplexing question of why—
despite the enormous probability that other life exists in the universe and would have
had billions of years longer than our relatively young civilization to master galactic
travel—have we not seen aliens? This failure to find any sign of extraterrestrial life given
the enormous likelihood of its (advanced) existence suggests something is going wrong
for everyone—a notion conceptualized as the “Great Filter,” representing the theory that
intelligent life continually meets its end at a certain point before reaching the ability to
explore the rest of the galaxy. Using basic mathematical models of population biology,
Frank postulates that the Great Filter may simply be the universal failure of all advanced
life to achieve sustainability with its planet as, after all, any energy-intensive civilization
will invariably have planetary feedback as it grows and harnesses resources. For a sum-
mary of his findings, see Kevin Loria, There’s a Compelling Explanation for Why We’ve Never
Found Aliens—And It Could Mean Humanity Is Doomed, BUS. INSIDER (June 25, 2018),
https://www.businessinsider.com/climate-change-could-answer-fermi-paradox-2018-6
[https://perma.cc/SJ3E-VAQY].
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I. IMPEDIMENTS TO EFFECTIVE CLIMATE ACTION
Given that no nation will be immune from the serious repercussions
of unchecked global warming, why has there not yet been lucid, meaningful
cooperation among countries to address this foreseeable crisis? Despite
the recorded severity of climate change and alarming predictions for further
consequences, three factors in particular impede effective action to address
the issue. One, notwithstanding the overwhelming scientific evidence of
climate change’s existence, the science is less clear as to the exact conse-
quences that we can expect from failure to reform our practices.10 This
ambiguity affects both how the issue is perceived and subsequently acted
upon.11 Two, lobbying and politics, particularly from the energy sector, have
stymied and constrained policy action contrary to established, profitable
business practices.12 Finally, three, the current structure of our interna-
tional system is inherently ill-suited to coordinating binding international
action and is instead dependent upon altruistic, voluntary action from indi-
vidual countries.13 In the context of climate mitigation—at its core a global
public good—we are all victims of an unchecked free rider problem.14
A. Psychological Headwinds
Most people today realize and agree that climate change is real,
significant, and problematic.15 That said, even the most ardent climate
10 See generally JONATHAN ROUGIER & MICHEL CRUCIFIX, UNCERTAINTY IN CLIMATE SCI-
ENCE AND CLIMATE POLICY (2014), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1411.6878.pdf [https://perma.cc
/ZSF2-EWMP].
11 See Janet Swim et al., Psychology and Global Climate Change: Addressing a Multi-faceted
Phenomenon and Set of Challenges, AM. PSYCH. ASS’N 6, 8 (2009), https://www.apa.org
/science/about/publications/climate-change-booklet.pdf [https://perma.cc/DU7X-FXCQ].
12 Andrew C. Revkin, Industry Ignored Its Scientists on Climate, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23,
2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/24/science/earth/24deny.html [https://perma.cc
/46F6-5DMJ].
13 President Donald Trump’s decision to pull the United States out of the celebrated Paris
Agreement, with impunity, is a perfect illustration of the system’s infirmity. See Statement
by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord, WHITE HOUSE (June 1, 2017) [hereinafter
Statement by President Trump], https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-state
ments/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord/ [https://perma.cc/YP7W-K4KJ].
14 Martin L. Weitzman, On a World Climate Assembly and the Social Cost of Carbon, 84
ECONOMICA 559, 562–63 (2017).
15 There are, of course, still some people, particularly in the United States, who remain
unconvinced that climate change is a product of man-made actions. See Oliver Milman
& Fiona Harvey, US Is Hotbed of Climate Change Denial, Major Global Survey Finds,
GUARDIAN (May 8, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/may/07/us-hot
826 WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 45:821
advocates cannot exhort the imperative of change with any specificity or
certainty as to the consequences of nonaction because such concreteness
is currently beyond the reach of predictive science.16 Climate science lec-
turer at the University of Melbourne Andrew King put it this way: “With-
out a doubt [climate change] is a huge threat to human civilization—it’s
the details that we need to pin down.”17 However, the ambiguity in the “de-
tails” regarding global warming’s consequences, in itself, has consequences.
1. Perception
Ambiguity shapes our very perception of climate change as an
issue. The wide variation in climate predictions has naturally spurred
wide variation in public rhetoric used to discuss global warming, which
in turn informs how we perceive the severity of the issue.18 For example,
some current studies go as far as to insist that we are headed down a
path toward human extinction, even as early as 2050.19 Meanwhile, other
predictions acknowledge that climate change will likely be deleterious to
our living conditions, particularly for poorer populations, but firmly belie
any suggestion that climate change presents an existential threat to hu-
manity.20 This discord matters, and disproportionately so, when considering
an issue such as climate change because most people today do not directly
experience climate change—our perception of the problem is formed almost
entirely from various media and educational sources and personal inter-
actions.21 Yet, our perception of the problem directly informs our level of
concern, and thus our motivation to act or support policy changes that
bed-climate-change-denial-international-poll [https://perma.cc/U66J-ADQ6]. It goes without
saying that this population believes that no level of international action is needed given
that to them global warming is either not occurring, or is a natural process not deserving
of alarm. See id.
16 See Predicting the Climatic Future Is Riddled with Uncertainty, ECONOMIST (Sept. 21,
2019), https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2019/09/21/predicting-the-cli
matic-future-is-riddled-with-uncertainty [https://perma.cc/T3GP-GFE9].
17 Julia Hollingsworth, Climate Change Could Pose ‘Existential Threat’ by 2050: Report,
CNN (June 4, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/04/health/climate-change-existential
-threat-report-intl/index.html [https://perma.cc/84YG-3G8R].
18 See Swim et al., supra note 11.
19 David Spratt & Ian Dunlop, Existential Climate-Related Security Risk: A Scenario
Approach, BT POL’Y PAPER, May 2019, at 8.
20 See, e.g., Jonah Goldberg, Climate Change Is a Real Concern—Not an Existential Crisis,
NAT’LREV.(Sept. 6, 2019), https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/09/climate-change-excuse
-democrats-transform-economy/ [https://perma.cc/5323-DP2A].
21 See Swim et al., supra note 11, at 17.
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address the issue.22 Put simply, the less concrete our perception of a
problem and attendant concern, the less urgent our motivation to act.23
Now introduce the dimension of time and distance. These nebulous
“consequences” of climate change will supposedly only occur in the “future”
and mostly in “other places.”24 Humans have the unfortunate proclivity
to discount or undervalue future or distant risks.25 Thus, our perception
of the importance of climate change is inexorably discounted consonant
with the limits of our temporal and spatial processing.26 Put simply, even
for the most receptive vessel (someone who is willing and eager to under-
stand the issue), climate change is not internalized with certainty, urgency,
or immediacy.27 While this may accurately reflect the further away, less
urgent and certain consequences than say touching one’s hand to a hot
stove, it is mismatched to the nexus of action.28 That is to say that the
faraway catastrophe does not come as a result of faraway action—it is
linked to action occurring now.29 Now reconsider ambiguity in the context
of decision-making.
2. Ambiguity Effect
Our cognitive inclination is to select options for which the proba-
bility of a favorable outcome is known over an option where the probability
of a favorable outcome is unknown.30 This is known in economics as the
“ambiguity effect.”31 This concept plays out in two important ways regard-
ing climate change. One, on a meta level, because we do not have a clear
understanding of the gravity or shape of climate change and its conse-
quences, we cannot accurately ascribe a value to the would-be favorable
result of mitigating it.32 In other words, we are unsure of the size and
character of the potential harm we would be avoiding, and therefore
22 Id. at 22.
23 Id.
24 Rachel I. McDonald, Perceived Temporal and Geographic Distance and Public Opinion
About Climate Change, OXFORD RES. ENCYCLOPEDIA (Sept. 2016).
25 Id.; see also Swim et al., supra note 11, at 25, 66.
26 See Swim et al., supra note 11, at 25, 66.
27 See id.
28 See id.
29 The Causes of Climate Change, NASA, https://climate.nasa.gov/causes/ [https://perma
.cc/WE86-LXH9] (last visited Mar. 10, 2021).
30 Deborah Frisch & Jonathan Baron, Ambiguity and Rationality, 1 COLUM. J. BEHAV.
DECISION MAKING 149, 152 (1988).
31 Id.
32 See Swim et al., supra note 11, at 65.
828 WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 45:821
ambiguity taints even our conception of a favorable outcome.33 Two, on
a practical level, we cannot be sure that our actions will even produce the
desired result (of which we cannot ascribe a value), which further reduces
our inclination to opt for that option, particularly where costs attend it
and where more certain options for favorable outcomes sit on the table.34
To illustrate, a world leader faced with the choice to pursue an eco-
nomic policy that is reasonably certain to advance her country’s prosperity,
or a climate policy that will cost her country millions of dollars to abate
ambiguous consequences—with an uncertain probability of success35—
will naturally find herself disinclined to choose the latter.36 This logic
also extends to her citizen who chooses to drive his car to work, for which
the benefits of expediency and convenience are known, over taking the
public bus, for which the probability of producing the favorable outcome
attending such option (ostensibly mitigating climate change), is unknown
to him.37 In short, there are built-in psychological headwinds against
individuals making climate-based decisions inhering in the ambiguous
nature of the issue.38
33 See id.
34 Id. at 25 (“While the costs of mitigating actions are incurred immediately, their uncertain
and future benefits get discounted, making the deliberative consideration of such actions
unlikely to arrive at socially responsible and long-term sustainable behavior.”).
35 The success of such a policy is inherently dependent on the behavior of other actors
over which the world leader has no control, further reducing her likelihood of acting. This
is what is known as the “collective action problem.” Id. at 67 (“Stated in psychological lan-
guage, people sometimes do not act because they perceive that they have little behavioral
control over the outcome.”).
36 Id. at 25.
37 Id.
38 It is more than worth noting that the lack of certainty surrounding global warming also
aids our tendency to affirmatively minimize or ignore the issue, particularly when to
lucidly address it would inconvenience or revolutionize our lifestyles. See Swim et al.,
supra note 11, at 66–67 (“Habit may be one of the most important obstacles to the
mitigation of climate change impacts.” (citations omitted)). Another culprit of this type
of behavior is a phenomenon known in the psychology community as “cognitive dissonance.”
Cognitive Dissonance, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/diction
ary/english/cognitive-dissonance [https://perma.cc/R29T-E4A7] (last visited Mar. 10, 2021)
(“[A] state in which there is a difference between your experiences or behaviour and your
beliefs about what is true”). As applied to climate change, it represents the ability to feel
internal anxiety and concern regarding the issue while persisting in environmentally de-
structive behavior. See How Your Brain Stops You from Taking Climate Change Seriously,
NPR(Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/how-your-brain-stops-you-from
-taking-climate-change-seriously [https://perma.cc/TNV8-7UT3]. Rare exceptions to this
phenomenon may be individuals such as Greta Thunberg. See Jonathan Watts, Greta
Thunberg Sets Sail for New York on Zero-Carbon Yacht, GUARDIAN (Aug. 14, 2019), https://
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B. Constrained Politics
Meaningful climate action has been stymied by more than just our
individual cognitive limitations—such efforts have been systematically
undermined for years by the energy sector, particularly in the United
States.39 Indeed, residual damage remains from the infamous lobbying
campaign by the Global Climate Coalition before the turn of the century,
credited for producing much of the domestic resistance to climate policy in
the United States today.40 Perhaps even more intractable for the struggle
toward meaningful policy, however, is the change-resistant natural in-
ertia inherent in the political-economic relationship between incumbent
energy firms and government, a relationship further entrenched by active
lobbying efforts today.41
1. The Global Climate Coalition
It is axiomatic that the main reform necessary to combat global
warming—namely, a severe reduction in the global emission of greenhouse
gases—is diametrically opposed to the current operation and profitability
of the fossil fuel industry. Unsurprisingly, the industry has fought tooth
and nail to secure its economic health and prospects against growing calls
for climate action.42 Among these efforts has been the aggressive crusade
promulgated by the well-organized, well-funded “Global Climate Coalition,”
www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/aug/14/greta-thunberg-sets-sail-plymouth-cli
mate-us-trump [https://perma.cc/X5CR-BXQA] (noting Greta Thunberg’s choice to eschew
flying to the United States in lieu of a two-week carbon-neutral boat ride). For most of us,
however, cognitive dissonance explains how we can passionately scold our climate-denier
grandfathers about the realities of climate change over a steak dinner, or drive a gas
guzzling car to a climate rally. See Kate Cohen, Most of Us Are Hypocrites on Climate
Change. Maybe That’s Progress., WASH.POST. (Aug. 25, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/opinions/most-of-us-are-hypocrites-on-climate-change-maybe-thats-progress/2019
/08/25/21e49b4e-c5cd-11e9-b5e4-54aa56d5b7ce_story.html [https://perma.cc/CY4R-WBGH].
39 Shannon Hall, Exxon Knew About Climate Change Almost 40 Years Ago, SCI.AM. (Oct. 26,
2015), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/exxon-knew-about-climate-change-al
most-40-years-ago/ [https://perma.cc/4KAX-XF9B].
40 See Revkin, supra note 12.
41 Frank W. Geels, Regime Resistance Against Low-Carbon Transitions: Introducing Politics
and Power into the Multi-Level Perspective, 31 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y, Sept. 2014, at
21, 22, 26–27.
42 See Wendy E. Franz, Science, Skeptics and Non-State Actors in the Greenhouse, BELFER
CTR. FOR SCI. & INT’L AFFS., Sept. 1988, at 13–18.
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founded in 1988 by a coalition of over 250,000 firms.43 Before the coalition
was disbanded in 2002, it rigorously executed a political lobbying and
public relations crusade that involved “(1) raising public concern about
unemployment from emission regulations, (2) releasing reports that ques-
tioned whether global warming was actually taking place, (3) attending
climate negotiation meetings ‘en masse,’ (4) sending a letter ‘signed by
119 of the United States’ most prominent business leaders’ to President
Clinton, asking that all current climate proposals be rejected, and (5)
insisting that developing countries commit to the same stringent reduc-
tions as industrialized nations.”44 These coordinated efforts45 not only
sowed confusion and mistrust surrounding climate change science among
the average individual,46 but reportedly helped precipitate the decision of
the United States, the world’s second largest emitter of C02,47 to withdraw
from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001.48
2. Political-Economic Inertia
In addition to decades of confusion and mistrust sown from the fos-
sil fuel industry’s misinformation and delegitimization campaign, climate
policy has also been structurally impeded by inertia to change inhering
in the relationship between incumbent energy firms and government.49
This relationship can be understood as a dependence regime—firms and
industries rely on the government to establish property rights, contractual
obligations, and general regulation of legal and illegal forms of corporate
43 Donald O. Mayer, Symposium: Corporate Governance, Stakeholder Accountability, and
Sustainable Peace: Corporate Governance in the Cause of Peace: An Environmental Perspec-
tive, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 585, 612 (2002).
44 Id. (internal brackets and ellipsis omitted).
45 Other efforts included advertising campaigns from trade and union associations such
as the American Petroleum Institute and the United Mine Workers of America that warned
of general increases in prices that would supposedly result from climate agreements, and
stressed the inequity of exempting developing countries from binding commitments. See
id. at 612–13.
46 See Franz, supra note 42 (reporting fossil fuel coalition’s memo pledging to sow doubt
surrounding climate change contained stark quote to the effect that “[v]ictory will be
achieved when the average person is uncertain about climate science.”).
47 Each Country’s Share of C02 Emissions, UNION OF CONCERNEDSCI.(Aug. 12, 2020), https://
www.ucsusa.org/resources/each-countrys-share-co2-emissions [https://perma.cc/F4UB-C676].
48 John Vidal, Revealed: How Oil Giant Influenced Bush, GUARDIAN (June 8, 2005),
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2005/jun/08/usnews.climatechange [https://perma
.cc/DM45-JW8D].
49 Geels, supra note 41, at 27–28.
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behavior, while governments in capitalist societies are incentivized for
industries within their economies to succeed.50 Unsurprisingly, this alli-
ance is geared toward maintaining the status quo.51
As a byproduct of the mutualistic relationship, the fossil fuel sector
also enjoys enhanced access to governmental policy, allowing it to ac-
tively combat changes that threaten its practices, and even influence the
passage of favorable policy.52 Indeed, dependency facilitates close con-
tacts and relational networks between industry leaders and policymakers,
leading many policymakers to consult energy lobbies about new proposals
and to even “internalize the ideas and interests of industries.”53 Firms
also independently employ corporate political strategies to secure influence,
such as organized pressure, direct lobbying, and confrontation strategies
like litigation.54
This entrenched relationship, carefully deepened by the fossil fuel
industry, is a daunting prospect to climate policy.55 Some argue that mak-
ing environmentalism profitable to the energy sector, or “commoditizing
the environment,” is the key to future policy success.56 Others exhort that
the heart of the infirmity is capitalism itself and that environmental sus-
tainability cannot be achieved in our current market system.57 At the very
least, it is clear that the fossil fuel industry as it currently operates today
can have little to no place in a world economy that is emitting the requi-
sitely low levels of greenhouse gases to avoid further global warming.58
50 Id. (“[C]apitalist societies are systematically dependent on economic growth, which
implies that a central role of the state is to advance the general interests of capital.”
(citation omitted)).
51 Id. at 26.
52 Id. at 27–28.
53 Id. at 27.
54 Id.
55 See, e.g., Alexander C. Kaufman, Senators Not Backing Green New Deal Received on Aver-
age 7 Times as Much Fossil Fuel Cash, HUFF. POST (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.huffpost
.com/entry/senate-green-new-deal-fossil-fuel-donations_n_5c6dc9b2e4b0e2f4d8a24e83
[https://perma.cc/JP7A-37C2].
56 CHRISTOPHER WRIGHT & DANIEL NYBERG, CLIMATE CHANGE, CAPITALISM, AND CORPO-
RATIONS: PROCESSES OF CREATIVE SELF-DESTRUCTION 4 (2015) (“[O]ur only hope to stop
climate change is for industry to make money from it.” (citation omitted)).
57 See, e.g., Jonathan T. Park, Climate Change and Capitalism, 14 CONSILIENCE: J. SUS-
TAINABLE DEV. 189, 189 (2015); see also HANS A. BAER, GLOBAL CAPITALISM AND CLIMATE
CHANGE:THENEED FOR AN ALTERNATIVE WORLDSYSTEM 149 (2012); Phil McDuff, Ending
Climate Change Requires the End of Capitalism. Have We Got the Stomach for It?, GUARD-
IAN(Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/mar/18/ending-cli
mate-change-end-capitalism [https://perma.cc/5F45-7Y8M].
58 See Ståle Holgersen & Rikard Warlenius, Destroy What Destroys the Planet: Steering
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Thus, a green way forward must find a way to impose sufficient pressure
or economic incentives on the energy sector to ensure its “creative destruc-
tion,” or, put another way, to force the sector to redesign itself consonant
with the surrounding climate exigency.59
This Article does not attempt to address the granular economic
details of how the domestic or international energy industry would have
to adjust on a practical level to still provide its basic, necessary functions
without conflicting with carbon limits. Certainly, new green innovation
and technology will be a necessary part of that process and many papers
do and will continue to grapple with that level of detail.60 Rather, this
Article is concerned with first laying the groundwork to produce the
requisite pressure that has been sorely absent on a national level,61 and
systematically impracticable on an international level.62
C. The Anarchical International System
Put simply, our international system is not a hospitable environ-
ment for enforceable collective action.63 Since 1648, our world has func-
tioned primarily upon a concept called Westphalian Sovereignty,
whereby every country, no matter how big or small, has exclusive sover-
eignty over its territory.64 This concept is even enshrined in the United
Creative Destruction in the Dual Crisis, 40 CAP. & CLASS 511 (2016); see also Geels, supra
note 41, at 37.
59 See Holgersen & Warlenius, supra note 58, at 523.
60 See, e.g., Xiaodong Lai & Qian Shi, Green and Low-Carbon Technology Innovations, in
INNOVATION STRATEGIES IN ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE 209, 210 (2020); Mario Cervantes
et al., Accelerating the Development and Diffusion of Low-Emissions Innovations, OECD
5 (2018); Rasi Kunapatarawong & Ester Martínez-Ros, Towards Green Growth: How
Does Green Innovation Affect Employment?, 45 RSCH. POL’Y 1218 (2016).
61 Some countries, of course, have been relatively successful in establishing strong domestic
climate policies. Switzerland and France, for example, are exalted for green practices
within their borders, earning them the top spots on the “Environmental Performance
Index” chart. See 2018EPI,ENV’T.PER.INDEX, SEDAC, https://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu
/data/set/epi-environmental-performance-index-2018/maps [https://perma.cc/BJ3R-PBPL]
(last visited Mar. 10, 2021). However, Switzerland and France combined account for less
than two percent of the world’s C02 emissions, whereas the United States alone accounts
for sixteen percent, and China accounts for a whopping twenty-nine percent. See UNION
OF CONCERNED SCI., supra note 47. To meaningfully address global warming, solutions
must subsume China and the United States.
62 Weitzman, supra note 14, at 2.
63 See id.
64 Derek Croxton, The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty, 21 INT’L
HIST. REV. 569, 569–70 (1999).
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Nations (“UN”) Charter65 and, as a consequence, international treaties
or accords bind countries only by their word.66 Indeed, absent a world gov-
ernment (or supernational body capable of controlling nations like states
control their citizens), all international agreements are de facto voluntary,
even if they purport to be otherwise, which few do.67 While soft conse-
quences may follow a decision to renege—such as international reproach,
or even backlash as severe as economic sanctions (assuming other countries
can effectively cooperate)—no true coercive power exists to bind countries
to the agreements they sign.68
While interdependence and international norms temper full “global
anarchy,” the upshot of our sovereignty regime is the reality that nations,
particularly powerful ones, mainly cooperate only when it suits them and
diverge when international goals threaten self-interest.69 Yet, while this
system has doubtlessly produced deadweight on myriad, potentially avoid-
able, military, moral, and economic issues, on balance, the world generally
continues to deem the trade-off of self-determination to be worth it.70 This
regime, however, has predictably had ruinous consequences for the func-
tional success of climate accords, where the strain on self-interest is high,
and the benefits are uncertain, diluted, and unavoidably collective.71
65 See U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 4 (“All members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”).
66 Weitzman, supra note 14, at 3–4.
67 The 2015 Paris Agreement does include a series of “mandatory” measures for monitoring,
verification, and public reporting of countries’ success in meeting emission targets. See
Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art.
13, Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104. However, as discussed infra, given the structure
of our international system, mandatory never really means mandatory.
68 See Weitzman, supra note 14, at 561–62.
69 See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 27–28
(2005).
70 Certainly, the European Union offers a counterexample to the general preference toward
unfettered sovereignty. However, the United Kingdom’s recent “Brexit” underscores
countries’ continuing proclivity toward maintaining control within their own borders. See
Graham Gee & Alison L. Young, Regaining Sovereignty? Brexit, the UK Parliament and the
Common Law, 22 EURO. PUB. L. 131 (2016).
71 See Weitzman, supra note 14, at 561; see also John A. Barrett, Jr., The Global Environ-
ment and Free Trade: A Vexing Problem and a Taxing Solution, 76 IND. L.J. 829, 848–49
(2001) (“Furthermore, even those parties interested in negotiating and joining a treaty
do so from the perspective of their economic, environmental, and political needs. As a conse-
quence, the compromises that are generally necessary for an effective environmental treaty
acceptable to large number of countries often result in a treaty with relatively modest goals,
requirements, and obligations.”).
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1. The (All but Foregone) Failure of Climate Accords
UN talks on climate change began as early as 1992 at the Rio Earth
Summit, producing the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (“UNFCCC”), a nonbinding document that mostly acknowledged
the existence of anthropogenic climate change and urged cooperation and
frequent meetings between the signatory parties.72 Discussions continued
for the UNFCCC signatories (or the “Conference of Parties”) in Berlin in
1995, where again, no binding agreement was reached.73 The subsequent
Kyoto Protocol, negotiated in December 1997 and entered into force in
February 2005, marked the first “legally binding” international accord
on climate change.74
The Kyoto Protocol divided the world’s countries into two blocs, the
high-income, industrialized nations (Annex I) and those countries not in
Annex I, consisting of the still industrializing countries.75 The Protocol pur-
ported to bind the participating Annex I countries to reduce their green-
house gas emissions by at least five percent below 1990 levels in the
commitment period of 2008 to 2012,76 while declining to impose any hard
commitments on the countries still “undergoing the process of transition
to a market economy.”77 The success of the Kyoto Protocol rested on the
hope that the good-faith compliance of the developed world would spur the
developing countries to follow suit while developed nations would con-
tinue to increase the robustness of their reduction commitments.78
Not only did no such synchronized cooperation ensue, but with the
refusal of the United States and Australia to even ratify the agreement,
as well as Canada’s subsequent withdrawal, the Kyoto Protocol was all
but dead out of the gate.79 Even for the still participating members, a
majority did not meet their emission targets by 2012.80
Subsequent efforts to renegotiate a Kyoto Protocol 2.0 were frus-
trated in large part by the same concerns that ostensibly animated the
72 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S. Treaty
Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
73 UN Climate Talks, COUNCIL ON FOREIGNRELS., https://www.cfr.org/timeline/un-climate
-talks [https://perma.cc/N5RQ-W2CK] (last visited Mar. 10, 2021).
74 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10,
1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162.
75 See id.
76 Id. at art. 3.
77 Id. at Annex B.
78 Weitzman, supra note 14, at 561.
79 Id.
80 Christopher Napoli, Understanding Kyoto’s Failure, 32 SAIS REV. INT’L AFFS. 183 (2012).
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United States and Australia’s refusal to participate in the first version—
namely, the perceived unfairness of exempting developing countries from
similar binding commitments.81 Indeed, the Conference of Parties failed
to reach a binding accord in Copenhagen in 2009, and failed again when
the United States opposed a proposal by the European Union in Durban
in 2011.82 While the Kyoto Protocol was extended until 2020 in wake of
these failures, the remaining members accounted for only fifteen percent
of global greenhouse gas emissions at the time.83 After another disap-
pointing resolution in Warsaw in 2013, the Conference of Parties finally
agreed upon the landmark Paris Agreement in 2015.84
Unlike the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement does not formally
distinguish between developed and developing countries in its require-
ment that countries set, and abide by, emissions reduction goals.85 These
reduction goals, or “nationally determined contributions,” are voluntarily
set by the countries themselves, and are to be collectively reviewed and
verified every five years.86 While many laud the agreement to be the most
significant climate agreement yet (particularly given that its participants
account for about ninety-five percent of the world’s greenhouse gas emis-
sions), the Paris Agreement suffers from the same fatal flaw as the Kyoto
Protocol—namely, the model’s failure to cure the free rider problem, or,
put differently, the lack of enforceability.87
Indeed, imagine, as late Harvard Professor Martin Weitzman count-
erfactually hypothesized in his paper, if instead of the current regulatory
regime, the United States Clean Air Amendments of 1990 had assigned
a sulfur dioxide cap-and-trade system for power plants but allowed the
power plants “to voluntarily negotiate between themselves their own
initial caps on [sulfur dioxide] emissions.”88 Further imagine that no penal-
ties followed “either under-ambitious voluntary targets or under-fulfillment
of [those] under-ambitious voluntary targets.”89 To extend the metaphor
even further, now imagine that the second largest powerplant could pull
out of even participating in the voluntary, nonpunitive counterfactual
81 Weitzman, supra note 14, at 561; see also UN Climate Talks, supra note 73.
82 UN Climate Talks, supra note 73.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104.
86 Id. at art. 4.
87 Weitzman, supra note 14, at 561–62.
88 See id. at 562.
89 See id.
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Clean Air Amendments, because, the CEO did not like the “economic bur-
dens the [legislation] imposes.”90 Certainly, no one would suggest with a
straight face that these amendments were a realistic way to reduce sulfur
dioxide emissions in the United States; yet this is essentially the world-
wide system set up through the nationally determined contributions in
the Paris Agreement.91
Indeed, in a sobering check-in on the real life Paris Agreement,
on November 4, 2019, the Trump Administration, in charge of the world’s
second largest C02 emitter, began its formal withdrawal from the accord,
citing disagreement with the “economic burdens” the agreement imposed
on the United States.92 In Trump’s own words, the collective climate agree-
ment, and its supporters, “don’t put America first.”93 While many around
the world and even some within Trump’s own country loudly decried this
decision,94 the international system, by structure, had no response.95
Unfortunately, despite the global community’s subsequent efforts
in December 2019 to hammer out further details of the Paris Agreement
notwithstanding the United States’ disappointing withdrawal, the Madrid
talks were widely considered a failure.96 Attending countries failed to
90 Cf. Statement by President Trump, supra note 13.
91 See Weitzman, supra note 14, at 561–62.
92 Rebecca Hersher, U.S. Formally Begins to Leave the Paris Climate Agreement, NPR
(Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/11/04/773474657/u-s-formally-begins-to-leave
-the-paris-climate-agreement [https://perma.cc/43KR-GLJK]; Statement by President Trump,
supra note 13; Umair Irfan, UN Climate Talks in Madrid Ended Without Resolving Their
Toughest Issue, VOX (Dec. 15, 2019), https://www.vox.com/2019/12/15/21022674/cop25-ma
drid-climate-change-greta-thunberg [https://perma.cc/D29N-EY7J].
93 Statement by President Trump, supra note 13. This kind of rationale directly highlights
the tension between the global public good of climate mitigation and domestic economic
considerations, underscoring the argument that perhaps climate policy should be isolated
and disaggregated from nations’ normal legislative operations. See infra Section II.C.
94 Carbon Brief Staff, Global Reaction: Trump Pulls US Out of Paris Agreement on Climate
Change, CARBON BR. (June 2, 2017), https://www.carbonbrief.org/global-reaction-trump
-pulls-us-out-paris-agreement-climate-change [https://perma.cc/YQV3-HSGZ].
95 That is to say, the international community could not enforce the United States’ original
commitment to the agreement nor punish the country for reneging, even despite the obvious
imperative of securing the cooperation of the high-emission country. Cf. Weitzman, supra
note 14, at 561–62.
96 See, e.g., Kate Dooley, The Madrid Climate Talks Failed Spectacularly. Here’s What Went
Down, CONVERSATION (Dec. 15, 2019), https://theconversation.com/the-madrid-climate-talks
-failed-spectacularly-heres-what-went-down-128921 [https://perma.cc/5QWV-9EK3];
Sagatom Saha, Why U.N. Climate Talks in Madrid Were a Massive Failure, WORLD POL.
REV. (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28424/on-climate-change
-un-talks-depends-on-national-politics-most-of-all [https://perma.cc/YQV3-HSGZ]; Irfan,
supra note 92.
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find consensus on several key issues relating to Article 6 of the Paris
Agreement, in particular, on a schematic to govern an international carbon
market.97 Underlying this failure is the longstanding reluctance of wealth-
ier, industrialized countries such as Australia and the United States to
commit to larger emissions cuts or open the door to be held liable for
climate-related damage.98 Indeed, when our international system licenses
states to forego collective action at odds with their immediate self-interest,
it cannot be not surprising when they do exactly that.99
2. The Free Rider Problem
While our international system presents obvious challenges for
cooperation, another structural factor (in this case, specific to climate co-
operation) frustrating meaningful action is the underlying free rider prob-
lem.100 Climate change mitigation is a non-excludable, non-rival public
good.101 This means that it is not possible to exclude a noncompliant coun-
try from enjoying the benefits of another nation’s contribution to reducing
its greenhouse gas output, nor can the public good be depleted by one
country’s enjoyment of it.102 To illustrate, if China decides to implement a
domestic law severely limiting its greenhouse gas emissions, it cannot ex-
clude, for example, the United States from enjoying the benefits of a safer
climate if the United States does not reciprocate with a similar policy.103
97 Irfan, supra note 92.
98 Id.
99 See John W. Head, Addressing Global Challenges Through Pluralistic Sovereignty: A
Critique of State Sovereignty as a Centerpiece of International Law, 67 U. KAN. L. REV.
727, 784 (2019).
100 Christian Gollier & Jean Tirole, Negotiating Effective Institutions Against Climate
Change, ECON. ENERGY &ENV’T. POL’Y 5, 6 (2015) (“The free-rider problem is well-known
to generate the ‘tragedy of commons’, as illustrated by a myriad of case studies in other
realms. When herders share a common parcel of land on which their herds graze, over-
grazing is a standard outcome, because each herder wants to reap the private benefit of
an additional cow without taking account of the fact that what he gains is matched by
someone else’s loss. Similarly, hunters and fishers do not internalize the social cost of their
catches; overhunting and overfishing led to the extinction of species, from the Dodo of the
island of Mauritius to the bears of the Pyrenees and of the buffalos of the Great Plains.”
(citation omitted)).
101 Mary B. Russell, What’s It to You?: The Difficulty of Valuing the Benefits of Climate
Change Mitigation and the Need for a Public-Goods Test Under Dormant Commerce Clause
Analysis, 94 IOWA L. REV. 727, 739 (2009).
102 Id.
103 See id.
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Further, countries implementing environmental policies will bear
100% of the cost of the green policy but will in turn only receive say one
percent of the benefits (assuming they have about one percent of the
world’s population and average exposure to climate-related disasters),
with the bulk of benefit instead accruing to other countries.104 As such,
it is in any individual country’s best interest to not incur the costs associ-
ated with climate action and instead just enjoy the benefits of others’
sacrifices, or put another way, to “free ride.”105 The end result of such a
system, however, is what economists ominously call “a race to the bot-
tom.”106 In the context of climate mitigation, it represents the choice of
individual countries to continue their own self-interested utilization of
greenhouse gases, in part, because they cannot guarantee that others
will abstain even if they do, and so the world grows hotter to the detri-
ment of everyone.107
The cure to environmental free riding long proposed by econo-
mists is the “polluter pays principle.”108 This model ensures that polluting
entities internalize the negative externalities inflicted from their actions,
thus coalescing the interests of the harmed and the harmer, and in theory,
consequently reducing the damaging behavior.109 In practice, this looks
like a tax, for example, on a factory’s usage of carbon that is monetarily con-
sonant with the actual damage imposed by the pollution on the surround-
ing community that the factory would otherwise not have to suffer (the
externality).110 This forced internalization ensures that the factory must
grapple with the true cost of its actions on its spreadsheets when deciding
how much carbon to use going forward.111 To this end, a uniform carbon
tax or price on all carbon producers globally has been proposed as an
attractive solution for reducing global carbon usage.112
However, for a global carbon tax or price to work, enforceability
is imperative.113 This means that any universal carbon tax imposed upon
countries and the companies within their borders going forward needs to
104 See Gollier & Tirole, supra note 100.
105 Russell, supra note 101.
106 Id.
107 See id.




112 See, e.g., id.; Weitzman, supra note 14, at 564; see also Michael G. Pollitt, A Global Carbon
Market? (Univ. Cambridge Energy Pol’y Rsch. Grp. Working Paper No. 1608, 2016).
113 See Scott Barrett, Climate Treaties and the Imperative of Enforcement, 24 OXFORD REV.
ECON. POL’Y 239, 244 (2008).
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be binding in a concrete way to be effective.114 Indeed, imagine that our
planet is like a public field of grass currently being overgrazed by sur-
rounding farmers who allow their own cows unfettered access in a tragic
race to the bottom. Despite everyone’s anticipated loss of the shared re-
source, no individual farmer rationally wants to self-restrain, particularly
if he cannot be sure that his neighbor will do the same.115 One solution is
for the municipality to impose a uniform tax on farmers who graze more
than an individual share in step with the field’s grazing capacity, thus
discouraging overgrazing.116 However, you can imagine how this solution
falls apart when farmers are not bound to pay the tax. Like Weitzman’s
counterfactual on the 1990 Clean Air Amendments, what if the farmers
instead just signed an agreement stating they would agree to be taxed for
grazing above the safe limit, but at any time could avoid paying the tax
by simply withdrawing from the agreement, with impunity.117 Indeed,
under that model, my money would not be on the survival of the field.118
One may reasonably argue that a public field of grass, while per-
haps a precious resource to the local farmers, is a far cry from the pre-
ciousness of our planet, for which there is no alternative or replacement,
and thus the actors on that issue would surely cooperate to achieve pre-
servation. In theory, that logic is sound. In reality, empirical data makes
a fool of that hope.119
II. THE (UNAVOIDABLE) NEED FOR A BINDING MECHANISM
It is not necessarily a foregone conclusion that the achievement of
international cooperation requires concrete enforcement. Certainly, coali-
tions of nations have been relatively successful in voluntarily coordinating
114 See id.; see also Gollier & Tirole, supra note 100, at 14 (“[I]n no other area has voluntary
action succeeded as a solution to the problem of undersupply of a public good. In a sense, the
pledge-and-review process is similar to an income tax system in which each household would
be allowed to freely determine its fiscal contribution.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
115 David J. C. MacKay et al., Price Carbon—I Will if You Will, NATURE INT’L WKLY. J. SCI.
(Oct. 12, 2015) (“A strategy of “I will if you will” stabilizes higher levels of cooperation.
It is the most robust pattern of cooperation seen in laboratory and field studies of situations
open to free-riding.” (citation omitted)).
116 See id.
117 Cf. Weitzman, supra note 14, at 561–62.
118 Yet, again, this is essentially the system we have set to protect our most precious
resource—the planet. See id.
119 Emissions Gap Report 2019 Executive Summary, U.N.ENV’TPROGRAMME 5 (2019), https://
wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/30798/EGR19ESEN.pdf?sequence=13
[https://perma.cc/7WZP-7YK9]. Moreover, the inaction of civilizations like the one that
used to inhabit Easter Island warn against too much reliance on human common sense
to avoid its own (foreseeable) destruction.
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joint endeavors including with peacekeeping,120 eliminating diseases,121 and
even environmental treaties.122 However, climate change is not like other
problems, even global ones. It is singularly the largest collective action
problem this world has ever faced.123 Therefore, unlike other treaties, a
climate treaty must do three things simultaneously and without exception
to have a hope of success: 1) get most if not all countries to participate,
with the largest carbon emitters as imperatives; 2) get participants to com-
ply; and 3) do both of these things while requiring that parties substantially
reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.124 It is painfully clear that no
climate treaty to date has achieved this.125
120 Many consider the U.N.’s peacekeeping efforts in Liberia to have been a success. See,
e.g., Robert A. Blair, In Liberia, the U.N. Mission Helped Restore Confidence in the Rule
of Law, WASH.POST (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/04/30
/liberia-un-mission-helped-restore-confidence-rule-law/ [https://perma.cc/3BJK-7NZP];
Dee Maxwell Saah Kemayah, Sr., The Success of Peacekeeping in Liberia, MEDIUM (Dec. 6,
2018), https://medium.com/@UNPeacekeeping/the-success-of-peacekeeping-in-liberia-9efd
440d19d [https://perma.cc/F7W2-729N].
121 See Mark L. Goldberg, The Inside Story of How India Eliminated Polio, U.N.DISPATCH
(Oct.24,2018),https://www.undispatch.com/podcast-the-inside-story-of-how-india-elimi
nated-polio/ [https://perma.cc/KGW7-924Y]; Kenneth Pornillos, A Polio-Free India Is One
of the Biggest Achievements in Global Health, WORLD BANK (May 29, 2014), https://www
.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/05/29/polio-free-india-biggest-achievements-global
-health [https://perma.cc/YG9D-UCSL].
122 Generally regarded to be the most effective international environmental accord to
date, the Montreal Protocol is credited for facilitating the successful international efforts
to eliminate the usage of chlorofluorocarbons in response to the discovery of significant
holes in the ozone layer. See Mark L. Goldberg, The Inside Story of How the World Closed
the Hold in the Ozone Layer, U.N.DISPATCH (July 23, 2018), https://www.undispatch.com
/podcast-the-inside-story-of-how-the-world-closed-the-hole-in-the-ozone-layer/ [https://
perma.cc/4PZ4-7M89]; Gillian Nelson, Montreal Protocol: Successful Ozone and Climate
Agreement Turns 30, IISD (Sept. 19, 2017), http://sdg.iisd.org/news/montreal-protocol-suc
cessful-ozone-and-climate-agreement-turns-30/ [https://perma.cc/DJ34-ZDYL]. It is accord-
ingly tempting to believe that the international cooperation achieved in Montreal on an
issue arguably also presenting a collective action free rider problem in its own right
suggests that climate change is similarly manageable under volitional conditions; but
concrete differences (as well as the empirical record) belie this hope. See, e.g., Andrew Long,
Complexity in Global Energy-Environment Governance, 15 MINN.J.L.SCI.&TECH. 1055,
1060–62 (2014) (arguing that global ozone depletion was “caused by a discrete and identifi-
able group of actors within developed countries” where technological fixes were readily
available, whereas the greenhouse gas reductions necessary to mitigate climate change
raised deep equity concerns and required “major changes across a wide economics sectors
(such as energy and transportation) without any clear technological means of accomplishing
them”); see also Barrett, supra note 71, at 248–49.
123 Barrett, supra note 113, at 240.
124 Id. at 244.
125 See supra Part I.
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Indeed, for almost three decades, the world has tried and empiri-
cally failed to meaningfully address global warming through the negotia-
tion of volitional, altruistic accords.126 As of today, the latest accord, the
Paris Agreement, has been demonstrably deficient in its task to curtail
global greenhouse emissions.127 The UN warns that countries must triple
their nationally determined contributions to be on track for the 2°C goal
and increase by fivefold to stay under 1.5°C.128 If current policies do not
change,129 the world is projected to, conservatively, heat up 2.8°C to 3°C by
the end of the century,130 all but certain to bring catastrophic change across
the globe.131 Yet, global momentum has alarmingly been in the direction of
increasing, not decreasing emissions, and those currently responsible for
the most greenhouse gas emissions recently demonstrated in Madrid that
they are still not prepared to self-impose the requisite cuts anytime soon.132
Once we recognize and agree that the climate emergency cannot
go unaddressed, the conclusion follows that a different model entirely is
likely required. For the reasons argued below, this Article proposes that
a multilateral, market-driven enforcement platform, similar to that used
by the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), be utilized for future climate
enforcement.
126 See supra Part I.
127 See generally Emissions Gap Report 2019 Executive Summary, supra note 119.
128 See id. at 10.
129 Right now, the globe’s biggest greenhouse gas emitters’ current policy regimes are all in-
sufficient to meet the goal of staying below 1.5°C global warming. See Climate Target
Update Tracker, CLIMATEACTIONTRACKER, https://climateactiontracker.org/ [https://perma
.cc/MX4K-28UT] (last visited Mar. 10, 2021). The United States and Russia are “critically
insufficient,” China and Japan are “highly insufficient,” and Germany and India’s policies
are “2°C compatible.” Id. Even Norway and Switzerland fall under “insufficient,” meaning
that a continuation of their specific policies, while better, is still liable to allow global warm-
ing up to 3°C. Id.
130 Less conservative models indicate an expected 6°C temperature rise if current emissions
levels do not change. See U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RSCH. PROGRAM, supra note 8, at 32–33.
131 See Emissions Gap Report 2019 Executive Summary, supra note 119, at 10. Indeed,
consonant with this alarming warning, in December 2019, Australia recorded its hottest
day in history. Sahar Esfandiari, Australia Just Recorded Its Hottest Day in History, Cap-
ping a Year of Extreme Temperatures Around the World, BUS. INSIDER SA(Dec. 18, 2019),
https://www.businessinsider.co.za/extreme-weather-australia-records-hottest-day-in-his
tory-2019-12?r=US&IR=T [https://perma.cc/P55T-QZC5].
132 See supra note 96; see also Laura M. Lombrana et al., Climate Fight Takes a Blow with
No Deal on Carbon Markets, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019
-12-15/carbon-markets-fail-to-win-backing-at-un-climate-talks [https://perma.cc/QPY2
-5T7S] (Dec. 16, 2019); Karl Mathiesen, How Cop25 Turned Its Back on Climate Action,
CLIMATE HOME NEWS (Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.climatechangenews.com/2019/12/16
/madrid-talks-turned-back-climate-action/ [https://perma.cc/Y999-K2G6].
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A. [Controlling] Psychological Headwinds
As discussed in detail above, humanity is impeded by cognitive
limitations on our ability to perceive or make decisions consonant with
the severity of global warming.133 Further, our existent habits actually
disincline us to fully acknowledge the issue, let alone act upon it; yet,
ironically, to some, clarity may be counterproductive as the gargantuan
size and attendant collective action problem may leave a subject despon-
dent, rather than energized to act.134
Accordingly, climate policies would do well to operate without
dependence on individual leaders’ consistent prioritization of climate
action over short-term gain.135 As this Article later proposes, a potential
solution is to require only a one-time buy-in from a sovereign country,
then operate with built-in safeguards against future shortsighted deci-
sions or changing political whims attending regime change.136 In this way,
an enforcement platform can act as a backstop to our own cognitive defi-
ciencies, protecting us from our proclivity to ignore, minimize, or soft-pedal
the issue.137
B. [Un-]Constrained Politics
Though the powerful Global Climate Coalition has since been dis-
banded, it may not come as a surprise that attendees to the 2019 Madrid
talks included big oil companies like Shell that pitched hard for carbon
133 See Swim et al., supra note 11, at 67.
134 See id. Though it is axiomatic, it may be worth emphasizing that a frog in a pot of water
will boil irrespective of whether he opts to ignore the changes, regardless of how he feels
about the water temperature rising, and despite his reasonable lack of uncertainty as to how
hot the water will actually get. To ground this (imperfect) metaphor: the consequences
began the second the stove was turned on (the Industrial Revolution) and our perception
of the water or our attitude toward it will not change the fact that the temperature will
continually rise until we do something about it. See How Do We Know?, supra note 3.
Whether the flames will get hot enough to actually boil us to death or simply continue to
increasingly make our pot less comfortable to be in, that result will occur regardless of
our ignorance, denial, or unrealized concern. Put another way, logic dictates that (more)
consequences of climate change are certain to come, and the ambiguity of our current
prediction models has no bearing on what will actually come to pass. Let us further be sure
that a retroactive appeal to our previous lack of certainty once it is too late will find no
audience in an unfeeling climate that will continue to respond only to the level of green-
house gases we emit, and not our feelings on the matter.
135 See Swim et al., supra note 11, at 65.
136 Such as President Trump’s decision to retreat from the Paris Agreement. See Statement
by President Trump, supra note 13.
137 See id.
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trading schemes and geoengineering technology that would permit their
continual production of fossil fuels.138 It may, however, be surprising that
the Paris Agreement, which ran sixteen pages, did not once mention the
words “fossil fuels,” “coal,” “oil,” or “gas” despite the fact that fossil fuels are
responsible for approximately two-thirds of global greenhouse gas emis-
sions.139 “Unlike the World Health Organization, which bans tobacco
lobbyists from [participating] in . . . tobacco cessation efforts, the UNFCCC
has no [such corruption protection]” and fossil fuel lobbyists have been
involved since the beginning, working hard to make “fossil fuel” a dirty
word in discussions.140 As a result, global climate negotiations have long
been pressured to steer clear of addressing fossil fuels directly, thus
largely sparing the industry from attention and pressure proportional with
its role in the crisis.141 Luckily, that culture has begun to shift in recent
years, thanks in large part to the tireless efforts of activists;142 however, the
problem of deep political-economic inertia within individual nations stub-
bornly remains.143
Because both energy corporations and government are incentivized
to guard the health of the energy sector, potentially disruptive national
climate policies must overcome a deep-seated entrenchment of mutual
interests within each individual country.144 Even farsighted political
leaders who may be keen to implement domestic environmental policies
are often blocked by members of their own governments who are either
unwilling to risk a market shake-up or who may be directly beholden to
energy interests.145 Indeed, it is no secret that the fossil fuel industry
exerts significant influence over many governments around the world,
138 See Megan Rowling, Trading Carbon Credits from Nature Sparks Fiery Debate at U.N.
Talks, REUTERS(Dec. 5, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-climate-change-accord
-carbontrading/trading-carbon-credits-from-nature-sparks-fiery-debate-at-u-n-talks-idUS
KBN1Y92TB [https://perma.cc/KKQ3-FGMW].
139 Catherine Abreu & Jamie Henn, Finally Saying the F-words at UN Climate Talks: Inter-
national Negotiations Have Always Focused on Carbon Emissions, Not the Coal, Oil and Gas






143 See Geels, supra note 41, at 27–28.
144 See id.
145 See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 55. Even policymakers who do not receive a dime from
energy interests have natural incentives for industries within their economies to succeed.
See Geels, supra note 41, at 27–28.
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particularly in the United States and Australia, making it difficult even
for progressive administrations to take the necessary action.146 This reality
reinforces the need for an external binding mechanism on individual
governments, in effect, to insulate climate policy from the fossil fuel in-
dustry’s influence. Without it, the consistency needed for global green
policies to be effective would likely suffer defeating interruptions from
varying countries’ intermittent relapses into corporate capture.147
Further, given that a sustainable long-term solution to climate
change requires (at the very least) radical evolution of the energy sector,
it is vital that external pressure be applied on the industry both uncom-
promisingly and consistently.148 Otherwise, corporations, which naturally
veer toward “business as usual” with an eye on quarterly or short-term
profits, will avoid radical transformations in favor of incremental shifts.149
In other words, if they are not sufficiently pressured to be creatively
destroyed (and subsequently rebuilt as truly green),150 they will continue
to “green wash” for the public relations campaigns but fail to address the
heart of the issue—namely, their greenhouse gas emissions.151
146 See Christopher Knaus, Mining Firms Worked to Kill Off Climate Action in Australia,
Says Ex-PM, GUARDIAN(Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019
/oct/10/mining-firms-worked-kill-off-climate-action-australia-ex-pm-kevin-rudd [https://
perma.cc/5CXV-C96U]; Karl Evers-Hillstrom & Raymond Arke, Fossil Fuel Companies
Lobby Congress on Their Own Solutions to Curb Climate Change, OPEN SECRETS (May 17,
2019), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2019/05/fossil-fuel-lobby-congress-on-climate
-change/ [https://perma.cc/C6EJ-CYP3].
147 See WRIGHT & NYBERG, supra note 56, at 72.
148 See id.
149 See id. (“[C]orporate risk framings remain wedded to ‘business as usual’ scenarios and
singularly fail to acknowledge the desperate exigencies of a carbon-constrained world.
Precisely the kind of devastating environmental change that is supposedly being
anticipated and avoided is thus locked in to an even more terrifying degree.”).
150 It is worth noting that outside pressure can also come from consumers. Indeed, many cor-
porations have already begun shifting toward greener practices to appease a consumer base
growing in consciousness of environmental issues. See David Hodari, For Business, Climate
Change Has Become Real, WALLST.J. (Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/for-busi
ness-climate-change-has-become-real-11576630804 [https://perma.cc/FBA8-C9XS]. How-
ever, complete reliance on public pressure to alter corporate practice is likely misplaced
as, while consumers may push hard enough to spur United Airlines’ investments in its “Eco-
Friendly Skies” program, they are less likely to push toward complete eradication of air
travel as they know it, which many rely on, even if that were the soundest way to ensure
reduced greenhouse gas emissions. See Swim et al., supra note 11, at 66–68. Consumers are
in many ways as beholden to their habits as corporations are to their spreadsheets. See id.
151 See WRIGHT & NYBERG, supra note 56, at 36–37; Stanley Reed, Oil Companies Ponder
Climate Change, but Profits Still Rule, N.Y.TIMES (Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com
/2019/10/07/business/energy-environment/oil-companies-climate-change-profits.html
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However, sufficient pressure can beget sufficient change. U.S. com-
panies in the 1990s began the wholesale phase out of ozone-damaging
chlorofluorocarbons (“CFCs”) and bona fide investment in alternatives after
the passage of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments which banned almost
all CFCs under penalty of law.152 In fact, the destructive power of CFCs
was publicly known as early as the 1970s, yet even after the United States’
piecemeal ban on their specific usage in aerosol products in 1978, U.S.
companies continued to expand their production of the inexpensive gas into
new profitable products such as refrigerants, computer chip solvents, and
foam-blowing agents—until 1990.153 Likewise, currently, European compa-
nies and investors are being forced to structurally greenify their practices
under binding pressure from stricter EU laws and regulations, without
much room to appease by “green washing.”154 It follows that what the world
requires is likely a similar application of binding pressure, on a global scale.
C. [Reimagining] the Anarchical International System
Perhaps the most compelling mandate for unprecedented concrete
climate enforcement is the unchecked free rider problem.155 Indeed, even
if every world leader could consistently rise above his or her own cogni-
tive limits and the fossil fuel industry went uncharacteristically silent,
each nation would still be faced with individual negative incentives to
[https://perma.cc/7845-DG4L] (“Critics say that oil companies are not backing up their
talk of concern about climate change with dollars. While companies are making green-
energy investments, a much larger proportion of most oil companies’ spending is going
into oil and gas projects that produce greenhouse gas emissions.”).
152 Ozone Protection Under Title VI of the Clean Air Act, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/ozone
-layer-protection/ozone-protection-under-title-vi-clean-air-act [https://perma.cc/BNG5-L8V7]
(last visited Mar. 10, 2021).
153 See Michael Weisskopf, U.S. to End CFC Production 4 Years Earlier Than Planned,
WALLST.J. (Feb. 12, 1994), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1992/02/12
/us-to-end-cfc-production-4-years-earlier-than-planned/e9202a0d-3bba-4883-bda0-da
3562e332bb/ [https://perma.cc/JRG8-BCFG].
154 See Katy Dartford & Julián López Gómez, How Companies Across Europe Are Creating
Sustainable Products Using No Fossil Fuels, EURONEWS(May 31, 2019), https://www.euro
news.com/2019/05/27/how-companies-across-europe-are-creating-sustainable-products
-using-less-water-and-less-en [https://perma.cc/DHK2-M3S4]; Emre Peker, What Qualifies
as a Green Investment? EU Sets Rules, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.wsj.com
/articles/eu-seals-deal-to-create-regulatory-benchmark-for-green-finance-11576595600
[https://perma.cc/549J-VP4Q].
155 See Gollier & Tirole, supra note 100, at 12–14.
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act;156 each nation, i.e., would remain individually best served by free
riding off of other countries’ sacrifices, and not risking the disadvantages
or costs themselves.157
That is not to say that every country will, or even has refused to act
for the collective good given these parameters. To be sure, certain countries
and coalitions have laudably engaged in forms of self-sacrifice,158 notably,
the European Union, through its passage of the recent “European Green
New Deal,” which outlines an ambitious plan for Europe to achieve carbon
neutrality by 2050.159 Contrary to conventional theories about free riding,
this plan has been implemented by the European Union without any re-
ciprocal commitment from other nations.160
However, the EU only accounts for approximately eight percent
of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions.161 The actions of this bloc of
nations, however encouraging, are mathematically inadequate to alone
sufficiently reduce the globe’s collective greenhouse gas output.162 Na-
tions like China, the United States, and India (which together, account
for approximately fifty-two percent of the world’s emissions) must be
subsumed in any plan going forward for a solution to be meaningful.163
156 See id.
157 See id.
158 It is not quite accurate to wholesale consider green reforms as a “sacrifice” per se; many
convincingly argue that green reforms may ultimately be economically beneficial to the
countries that employ them. See, e.g., Kate Whiting, This Is What a Green New Deal for
Europe Could Look Like, WORLD ECON. F. (May 21, 2019), https://www.weforum.org
/agenda/2019/05/this-is-what-a-green-new-deal-for-europe-could-look-like/ [https://perma
.cc/F45G-RG9T] (suggesting that the European Green New Deal is an improvement on
the prior program, the European Fund for Strategic Investments, which since 2015 has
“helped almost a million small and medium-sized companies, while creating more than
750,00 jobs, mobilising investments worth almost $440 billion”). However, given that
most markets are still some time away from widescale production of reliable, inexpensive
energy alternatives, there is inevitably some significant economic strain on countries that
decide to make the transition.
159 See Claudia Kemfert, Green Deal for Europe: More Climate Protection and Fewer
Fossil Fuel Wars, 54 INTERECONOMICS 353, 353, 355, 357–58 (2019).
160 Cf. Peter Asch & Gary A. Gigliotti, The Free-Rider Paradox: Theory, Evidence, and
Teaching, 22 J. ECON. EDUC. 33, 33, 35 (1991) (arguing that although the classical eco-
nomic theory of free riding requires coercion or sanctions to solve, the model fails to
account for individual behavior guided by a sense of commitment or morality rather than
pure self-interest).
161 See UNION OF CONCERNED SCI., supra note 47.
162 See id.
163 See id.
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Yet all three of these countries currently have domestic policies demonstra-
bly insufficient to keep the world below the 1.5°C mark,164 with China
and the United States rated as “highly insufficient” and “critically insuffi-
cient,” respectively.165
D. The Solution
The solution to a global free rider problem is no different than to
a national one—a process which externally aligns the actions of the
problematic actor with the interests of the public good.166 As discussed
supra, options for achieving this alignment include forcing the internal-
ization of the damaging behavior (in this case, through a uniform carbon
price or tax) or employing legislation like the U.S. Clean Air Act that
regulates individual behavior by imposing sufficient penalties for non-
compliance.167 We are quite comfortable employing these solutions at the
national level—unlike the counterfactual version of the Clean Air Amend-
ments of 1990, the real version actually tightened and expanded enforce-
ment of powerplants’ sulfur emissions levels168—yet when the problem is
conceptualized at an international level, we are paralyzingly reticent to
extend that logic. It may be true that the political reality presently renders
the notion of concrete climate enforcement unrealistic and fanciful, but if
this Article is trying to argue anything, it is that our continuing reliance
on the hope that countries’ self-disciplined altruism will, across the board,
164 Much is being made of the 1.5°C mark. This is because scientists believe that rising above
that temperature exponentially increases the risk of hitting feedback loop tipping points.
Special Report Global Warming of 1.5 °C, supra note 7. Truthfully, we may already be be-
yond a realistic path toward staying below 1.5°C or even 2°C. The fight for climate miti-
gation does not end, however, if we pass these benchmarks; if anything, it only increases
the urgency to limit slips into further, hotter temperatures. For a humanist take on the
matter, see Jonathan Franzen, What If We Stopped Pretending?, NEW YORKER (Sept. 8,
2019), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-comment/what-if-we-stopped-pretend
ing [https://perma.cc/UT7U-TSRU].
165 See CLIMATE ACTION TRACKER, supra note 129.
166 See Gollier & Tirole, supra note 100, at 12–13.
167 Another potential solution is privatization, inapposite here. See Prateek Agarwal, Free
Rider Problem, INTELLIGENTECON. (May 17, 2018), https://www.intelligenteconomist.com
/free-rider-problem/ [https://perma.cc/KD24-Y5WH].
168 Clean Air Act (CAA) and Federal Facilities, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement
/clean-air-act-caa-and-federal-facilities [https://perma.cc/ES23-LPAR] (last visited Mar. 10,
2021) (stating that, for example, penalty for federal facility noncompliance is a fine up
to $37,500 per day).
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realize sufficient climate mitigation is, itself, fanciful.169 In other words,
it’s not working. Time to try something new.
III. THE BINDING MECHANISM
It is tempting when considering how to design a system capable
of international enforcement to return to a familiar model—namely, a
government.170 Indeed, when contemplating putting an end to any one of
the variety of problems plaguing our globe, proposals and ideas for a
world government are abundant (alongside equal countervailing cri-
tiques).171 However, whatever the merits of a world government, the
challenges attending a road toward it are undoubtedly steep and require
protracted discussion, with an end goal perhaps ultimately not worth
pursuing.172 For even putting aside concerns of despotism, how would a
global sovereign be able to reconcile in any sort of uniform agenda or
justice the enormous plurality of differing identities, religions, and cul-
tures that live across the globe?173 And, in a sobering return to tyranny
concerns, how would this same world government be able to enforce its
laws or rulings? A massive world army? The targeted use of drone strikes?
Cyber control?
If the path to world government is ever to be walked down, it is
not one on which climate change must rely. That is because climate change
is not like other world problems, and the procedure to address it does not
require the same institutional complexity and sensitivity as would be
required for a supernational body to, for example, successfully broker
and enforce a peace agreement between the Israelis and Palestinians.
169 See Russell, supra note 101; see also Gollier & Tirole, supra note 100, at 13 (“[I]n no
other area has voluntary action succeeded as a solution to the problem of undersupply
of a public good. In a sense, the pledge-and-review process is similar to an income tax sys-
tem in which each household would be allowed to freely determine its fiscal contribution.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
170 Indeed, a government is a natural entity to impose something like a carbon tax, or
pass legislation like the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act.
171 See, e.g., Amin R. Yacoub, A World Government: A Critical Look into The Present, to
Foresee the Future, 50 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1443 (2018); Vincent J. Samar, A Preface
to World Government: A Comparison of the Current State of International Governance with
the State of Governance that Followed Adaptation of the American Articles of Confederation,
27 CONN. J. INT’L L. 1 (2011).
172 See Yacoub, supra note 171, at 1465–66.
173 To that end, some proposals suggest regional unions centered around more homogenous
parts of the globe, such as an African Group or Asia-Pacific Group, rather than one world
union. See id. at 1463.
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Rather, the issue of climate change can and must be properly categorized
as completely “other” to the other crises this world has known, even global
ones. That is because, climate change, unlike war or human rights viola-
tions, does not have winners and losers.174 It only has losers. Put another
way, global warming is an objective threat to every nation and every
individual on this planet without exception—it is a zero-sum game, except
this time we are all on the same side.175
Therefore, as an analytical matter, climate change, and by rela-
tion, climate policy, should be conceptually detangled from other areas
in which we otherwise grant sovereign nations the ability to subjectively
self-determine within their borders, such as education or even human
rights.176 Indeed, when contemplating the interplay of self-determination
and global governance, climate policy is better conceptualized as a natural
carve-out to self-determination, not as a threat to its existence.177 As all
countries independently share the desire for a stable climate (even if they
are less consistent about the role they individually want to play in the
achievement of this goal), enforced climate mitigation is actually a triumph
of self-determination (albeit a paternalistic one), but not its enemy.178 Even
more meta, unless countries intend self-determination to be a suicide pact,
enforced climate mitigation actually preserves the very existence of self-
determination, as it is difficult to self-determine when you are extinct.179
A. The Mechanics of a Climate Enforcement Mechanism
As a threshold matter, it is important to note that this Article is
agnostic as to exactly what type of climate policy or policies may be best
174 Nor does it require an exercise in subjectivity or cultural sensitivity.
175 While it is certainly true that some nations will suffer more than others, particularly
in the earlier stages of climate transformation, ultimately every nation will feel the
impacts of a hotter climate and the consequences of attendant ecosystem collapses. Not
to mention every country will suffer the market and refugee consequences of social and
political chaos following global food and water shortages. See Climate Change and Disaster
Displacement, UNHCR, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/climate-change-and-disasters.html
[https://perma.cc/K5PF-28L9] (last visited Mar. 10, 2021).
176 U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2 (“To develop friendly relations among nations based on
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take
other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace” (emphasis added)).
177 Cf. Head, supra note 99, at 784 (arguing for a new version of sovereignty that anticipates
“a new age in which agriculture is practiced differently and environmental restoration
is a fundamental and non-derogable value”).
178 Cf. id.
179 Allegedly.
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suited to achieving the global carbon cuts necessary.180 For ease, how-
ever, this Article will refer to a uniform carbon price as the desirable
program in need of enforcement.181
1. The WTO as a Model of (Relative) Success
The enforcement model underlying the WTO, the global organiza-
tion governing trade, is informative when considering how to fashion an
enforceable climate agreement.182 Unlike many other international agree-
ments which rely on “self-inflicted” punishment, the WTO’s rules are
enforced by other nations.183 In practice, countries utilize the WTO as an
inanimate platform to bring noncompliant nations into compliance with
free trade rules, and can be successful in doing this by offering a credible
threat of non-self-inflicted punishment—namely, retaliatory trade tariffs.184
The system largely works because the WTO creates an incentive for coun-
tries to comply (the very real threat of non-self-inflicted punishment),
while offering reduced trade barriers as a strong incentive for participa-
tion and for continued participation even after unfavorable verdicts as
nonmembers can be legally excluded from the free trade zone.185
In a way, climate change agreements and WTO agreements already
share an important commonality—a universal, desirable incentive for
participation: climate mitigation and free trade respectively.186 However,
a country that responds to another country’s climate violation with
retaliatory climate violations would likely: 1) have little to no success in
positively altering the first country’s behavior, and 2) be descriptively
living out the free rider problem to the detriment of the entire goal.187
180 Certainly, the best plan may involve a country-specific hybrid of different policies best
suited to each country’s unique needs.
181 A currently popular proposal. See Pollitt, supra note 112, at 10.
182 See Barrett, supra note 113, at 244.
183 See id.
184 For example, in 2002, the EU brought the United States before the WTO for allegedly
violating the rules by imposing tariffs on steel imports. The WTO agreed with the EU and
permitted it to legally rebalance tariffs against the United States. Shortly before the EU’s
carefully chosen package of goods to tariff was imposed, President Bush lifted the tariffs.
Barrett, supra note 113, at 244.
185 Id.
186 However, because climate mitigation does not presently have the same immediate,
tangible desirability as reduced trade barriers, this Article’s proposal largely remains
futuristic and impractical until such time that the visible threat of climate change is so
high that its mitigation is valued similarly, if not more, than favorable trading conditions.
187 See Gollier & Tirole, supra note 100.
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The challenge therefore is to fashion a similar but practicable credible
threat of non-self-inflicted punishment for climate violations.188
2. The Collateral Model Proposed
Assuming countries remain (perhaps wisely) unwilling to fully
submit sovereignty to a world government, how can they effectively ensure
that other nations will make and maintain the same costly cuts and
transformations? In short, how can sovereign countries guarantee the “I
will if you will” principle of free riding?189 The answer: the most tried and
true motivator of all—money.190
Indeed, if countries do not want to submit actual lawmaking
authority to a supernational legislature (which, to be effective, would
alarmingly require sufficient force to independently realize its legislative
mandates), they can instead grant another more contained means of
influencing their own domestic legislatures, and in turn, assure their
neighbors’ reciprocal legislative behavior. Much like individuals must
relinquish freedom in the state of nature to secure greater freedom,191
this Article proposes a mutual collateral system whereby individual coun-
tries issue bonds of sovereign debt,192 representing a percentage of their
annual gross domestic product (“GDP”), to be held as a guarantee of
climate compliance.193
To be more specific, upon ratifying the hypothetical treaty in ques-
tion, signatory countries would issue a bond (“Climate Bond”) representing
188 Indeed, “[t]he essential difference between enforcing a trade agreement and a climate
agreement is that trade is a bilateral activity whereas climate-change mitigation is a
global public good. Bilateral agreements are easy to enforce; multilateral agreements
seeking to supply a global public good are much harder to enforce.” Barrett, supra note
113, at 246.
189 MacKay et al., supra note 115 (“A strategy of ‘I will if you will’ stabilizes higher levels
of cooperation. It is the most robust pattern of cooperation seen in laboratory and field
studies of situations open to free-riding.” (citation omitted)).
190 See Immanuel Kant, Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, in TOWARD
PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER WRITINGS ON POLITICS, PEACE, AND HISTORY 67, 92
(Pauline Kleingeld ed., David L. Colclasure trans., 2006) (1795) (finding that the power
of money might be the most reliable tool in uniting nations).
191 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 1588–1679 (1968).
192 Cf. Gollier & Tirole, supra note 100, at 24 (arguing that “non-compliance with a climate
agreement should be treated as committing future administrations and treated as sov-
ereign debt”).
193 Given that different countries have differing levels of wealth and budgets, a uniform
number has been eschewed in favor of a proportional amount graduated in step with each
country’s individual economy.
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a portion of their annual GDP, call it three percent,194 to be held by the
treaty’s compliance institution as sovereign debt.195 These Climate Bonds
would remain perennially unvested, conditional upon countries’ continu-
ing successful compliance with domestic policies consistent with the
universal carbon price. Assuming a country never violated the climate
treaty, the only money that that country would owe on the bond would
be the yearly interest, used to fund the treaty’s institutional and admin-
istrative costs.196
Much like the WTO, enforcement of this agreement would consist
of individual or coalitions of member countries bringing an allegedly non-
compliant country before the judiciary organ of the treaty’s platform.197
The judiciary organ would first determine if the charged country’s domes-
tic policies were indeed noncompliant, and if so determined, the offending
country’s sovereign guarantee would be called in for full payment. At
that point, a country would be left with three options: 1) comply with the
climate agreement, 2) pay out its sovereign guarantee, or 3) default on
its sovereign debt.198
A country considering violating the universal carbon price would
thus face a substantial and credible threat of non-self-inflicted punish-
ment.199 That country would either have to make good on its sovereign
194 This number is only a filler estimation for a more precise figure that would have to
balance being small enough to not make countries baulk at the idea of underwriting but
large enough to make the cost of noncompliance more costly than compliance.
195 To be clear, neither the international institution nor any private banks would be actually
purchasing any country’s sovereign debt. The bonds would instead be like the funds pledged,
for example, from the United States to the International Monetary Fund, except in this case
they would only be called in upon violations of the climate treaty. See The Budgetary Effects
of the United States’ Participation in the International Monetary Fund, CONG. BUDGET OFF.
(June 16, 2016), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/51663 [https://perma.cc/E4TX-YG3H].
196 Given that these interest rates would reflect countries’ risk profiles—meaning the
United States, for example, will pay less than Argentina—it may be worth considering
a rebate system to reconcile that difference so that the least financially healthy countries
are not paying the most. See Sovereigns Rating List, COUNTRYECONOMY.COM, https://coun
tryeconomy.com/ratings [https://perma.cc/6L54-T88Z] (last visited Mar. 10, 2021).
197 The judiciary body would be similar to the WTO’s with a rotating non-permanent
panel. See WTO Bodies Involved in the Dispute Settlement Process, WTO, https://www
.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c3s3p1_e.htm [https://perma.cc
/N85J-5MKH] (last visited Mar. 10, 2021).
198 “Political default” is not an entirely foreign concept in international relations. The
United States strongly considered declaring Poland in sovereign default “not solely or
even principally for financial or economic reasons” during the country’s period of martial
law in the 1980s. See Kathleen M.H. Wallman, The Politics of Default: Politically Motivated
Sovereign Debt Default and Repudiation, 20 TEX. INT’L L. J. 475, 476 (1985).
199 Cf. Barrett, supra note 113, at 244.
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guarantee by issuing actual debt to pay out the Climate Bond, or else suffer
the market consequences of a downgraded sovereign risk rating, includ-
ing an increased future interest rate.200
In theory, this set-up undercuts the normal political expedience
of withdrawing from such an agreement during regime change or under
pressure from changing political winds.201 Now a president or prime minis-
ter considering pulling out of his predecessor’s agreement cannot do so
without the steep political costs of either incurring immediate and signifi-
cant debt to honor the Climate Bond or facing the market consequences
of downgrading his country’s credit rating.202 As such, this structure
inverts the typical decision matrix that pushes democracies toward
eschewing long-term gain to avoid short-term pain—now there is a very
real short-term pain to be suffered if a country foregoes long-term gain.203
The question begged at this point is, of course, why would any
country voluntarily hamstring itself in this way? It is undoubtedly true
that this system would mark a significant departure from current inter-
national norms for any country, much less a plurality of countries, to
volitionally give an international body this much concrete leverage over
their individual behavior.204 However, climate change is an unprece-
dented crisis—indeed, one that threatens our very existence.205 At the
200 See JULIANNE AMS ET AL.,CHAPTER 7SOVEREIGN DEFAULT, IMF 1, 2–3, 22 (2018) (“One
channel by which [sovereign] defaults affect market access and borrowing costs are credit
rating downgrades. It is well-known that ratings decrease markedly before and after
sovereign default events (see, e.g., S&P 2018). Post-default ratings can also remain low
for long periods, deterring institutional investors from buying and holding these low-
rated bonds.”); see also Guido Sandleris, The Costs of Sovereign Default: Theory and Empiri-
cal Evidence, ECONOMÍA 1, 13 (2016).
201 Cf. Statement by President Trump, supra note 13.
202 Which, in turn, increases the interest rate of future sovereign borrowing. See AMS ET
AL., supra note 200, at 20.
203 Thomas Carothers, Is Democracy the Problem?, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE
(Jan. 16, 2019), https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/01/16/is-democracy-problem-pub-781
37 [https://perma.cc/YX77-UFWT] (“To the limited extent they do manage to look to the
long term, democratic politicians are averse to imposing near-term pain for long-term
gain because of their need to keep voters happy for the next election.”).
204 Cf. Weitzman, supra note 14, at 562.
205 See Timothy M. Lenton et al., Climate Tipping Points—Too Risky to Bet Against, NATURE
(Nov. 28, 2019), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-03595-0 [https://perma.cc
/82TH-VN6R]; see also DAVID R. GRIFFIN, UNPRECEDENTED: CAN CIVILIZATION SURVIVE
THE CO2CRISIS? (2015). Moreover, public opinion and pressure surrounding global warming
is already rapidly changing, getting closer to a social tipping point. Indeed, more articles
and news stories are starting to use language such as “crisis,” “emergency,” “apocalypse,” and
“catastrophe” to describe the issue. See, e.g., Enrique Dans, Australia and the Climate
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very least, unchecked climate change will put unparalleled pressure on
global food production and water security, promising pervasive economic,
political, and social chaos and unrest in its wake (not to mention devas-
tating consequences for plant and animal species other than our own).206
Further,207 unlike other global issues, countries, even powerful ones, are
finding themselves increasingly powerless to keep the consequences from
spilling into their borders and threatening their citizens.208 Unlike the
Syrian refugee crisis or even the ongoing coronavirus pandemic, coun-
tries cannot simply declare their borders closed to climate disasters.209
Indeed, as the climate emergency grows and grows with increasingly dire
domestic consequences, a collateral model may become more palatable
to individual countries for its promise to secure the assured cooperation
of other similarly sovereign nations.210 Countries may decide that the
price of binding their own hands is worth the power to realize the “I will
Apocalypse, FORBES (Jan. 4, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/enriquedans/2020/01/04
/australia-and-the-climate-apocalypse/#2b93d8654722 [https://perma.cc/CM3W-W94M];
Laure Fillion, How 2019 Became the Year When the World Woke Up to the Climate Emer-
gency, SCI. ALERT (Dec. 29, 2019), https://www.sciencealert.com/how-2019-became-the
-year-when-the-world-woke-up -to-the-climate-emergency [https://perma.cc/KJK9-TBUA];
Paul Krugman, Apocalypse Becomes the New Normal: We’re Already in the Early Stages
of Climate Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/02/opin
ion/climate-change-australia.html [https://perma.cc/8BWK-CLCY]; Robin McKie, Portrait
of a Planet on the Verge of Climate Catastrophe, GUARDIAN (Dec. 2, 2018), https://www
.theguardian.com/environment/2018/dec/02/world-verge-climate-catastophe [https://
perma.cc/MSG2-QYUZ].
206 See Buis, supra note 8.
207 Though it seems odd there should be a “further” after accepting climate change undeni-
ably has the very real potential to end our civilization. See Lenton et al., supra note 205.
208 Countries may be able to block or mitigate, for example, personal involvement with
the Syrian refugee crisis, but climate disasters are another animal entirely. See Country
Responses to the Syrian Refugee Crisis, CTR.MIGRATION STUD., http://web.archive.org/web
/20210201015209/https://cmsny.org/jmhs-syrian-refugee-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/8Z4M
-F279] (last visited Mar. 10, 2021). Climate change by nature knows no national borders.
209 See, e.g., Coronavirus: US and Australia Close Borders to Chinese Arrivals, BBC (Feb. 1,
2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-51338899 [https://perma.cc/8HTW-KHG5].
210 In practice, imagine that the United States is halfway through an extremely expensive
green restructuring of its infrastructure pursuant to the uniform carbon price when India
declares that it intends to repeal or loosen its own domestic implementation of the carbon
price to bolster its economy. India must now contend with the very credible threat that
the United States, or indeed any member nation, including even Tuvalu, could challenge
its anticipated violation and India could stand to outright lose the 3% chunk of GDP
(approximately 78 billion dollars), or suffer the consequences of sovereign default. See
India GDP, TRADING ECON., https://tradingeconomics.com/india/gdp [https://perma.cc
/3WNH-A7WK] (last visited Mar. 10, 2021).
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if you will” concept in the collective fight against the climate crisis.211 In
other words, to become powerful, nations must first give up power.212
To guard against (the ironic) possibility of countries now free
riding off of others’ commitment to join and enforce this system, member
countries could use international carrots and sticks to further motivate
membership and ensure that the costs of not joining grow more expensive
with each new nation that decides to participate. For example, member
countries could institute a free trade zone only available to members,
similar to the carbon trading zone the European Union is already consid-
ering.213 Or charge nonmembers an exorbitant annual fee or tax to access
the free trading bloc, until they agree to comply with the climate treaty and
issue a Climate Bond as assurance.214 Additionally, if enough powerful na-
tions join, members could coordinate economic sanctions against holdouts
or even hold in abeyance nonmembers’ seats in other international bodies,
such as the United Nations, until those countries agree to join.215
a. Potential Problems
While this proposal faces a tough adaptation path given present
political realities, it also presents numerous other potential problems,
including:
1. How would the arbiters of compliance be chosen,
and how can we ensure their independence?
2. How would the arbiters make decisions in cases
where the question of compliance is genuinely un-
clear or ambiguous?
211 See MacKay et al., supra note 115, at 315–16.
212 See HOBBES, supra note 191, at 104–05.
213 Ewa Krukowska & Jonathan Stearns, Trade Rules Emerge as Weapon to Fight
Climate Change in Europe, BLOOMBERG(Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news
/articles/2019-10-08/trade-rules-emerge-as-weapon-to-fight-climate-change-in-europe
[https://perma.cc/774R-65SE].
214 Another possibility is to assess a substantial “per transaction” tax on all nonmembers
in the otherwise free trade zone which would put the most pressure on high carbon
emitters like China and the United States given their robust trade activity. See Johannes
Friedrich et al., This Interactive Chart Shows Changes in the World’s Top 10 Emitters,
WORLDRES.INST. (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.wri.org/blog/2020/12/interactive-chart-top
-emitters [https://perma.cc/8A6N-8BMC].
215 It would go without saying as well that, similar to the WTO, only compliant members
states would have the right to bring complaints before the panel. See Barrett, supra note
113, at 244. Further, receipt of climate aid from multilateral funds could also be con-
ditioned on membership and compliance with the treaty.
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3. Would portions of Climate Bonds be called in step
with the magnitude of a violation, or would a bona
fide violation of any size result in a 100% call of a
bond?
4. How can we ensure that the enforcement mecha-
nism is not abused or used to control countries on
issues other than climate change, such as nuclear
proliferation?
5. Is there a concern with centralizing power in the
face of climate change’s anticipated resource scar-
city and the related expected increase in social and
political tensions? In order words, if we are already
too late to mitigate severe climate transformation,
is it better for humanity to adjust in fragmented
nations and communities, with less risk of despo-
tism, or is it better to have an insulated system in
place capable of enforcing rational decisions for the
good of the collective?
These and more are all questions that further research and consideration
would have to answer. As always, any cure must be examined for its poten-
tial to be worse than the disease. Further, and importantly, this model does
not directly address the embedded inequity from the industrialized versus
non-industrialized world dimension of the climate problem. Indeed, not
only are non-industrialized nations to date objectively less responsible for
the damage—past, present, and future—but non-industrialized econo-
mies are also descriptively less capable of undergoing radical, necessary
market transformations toward renewable energies.216 A comprehensive
solution to climate change must therefore find a way to reconcile this
reality, while still securing the developed world’s support.217
CONCLUSION
We have less than a decade to limit climate change to 1.5°C—the
point at which scientists fear we will trigger potentially irreversible
216 U.S.GLOB.CHANGE RSCH.PROGRAM, supra note 8, at 11; see also Unprecedented Impacts
of Climate Change Disproportionately Burdening Developing Countries, Delegate Stresses,
as Second Committee Concludes General Debate, U.N. MEETINGS & PRESS COVERAGES
(Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/gaef3516.doc.htm [https://perma.cc
/C7CQ-WXLA].
217 See U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RSCH. PROGRAM, supra note 8, at 11.
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tipping points. Projections reveal that our current efforts, if unchanged,
will be resoundingly unequal to this urgent task. The Paris Agreement,
whatever its merits, is not working. At the very least, it is not working
fast enough. We need a binding agreement. And we need it fast.
The irony of this Article’s proposal is that its success might depend
on climate consequences being so visible and devastating that their very
arrival signals that the time frame for significant mitigation has passed.
However, as of today, there is still time. Scientific models support the
possibility of genuine mitigation, and this Article proposes in earnest a
potential solution in the unlikely event that we reach a societal tipping
point in time.
Ideas like the one proposed here, however, are not moot if we fail
to stay below safe temperature thresholds. Indeed, the imperative to
continue to mitigate and adapt to climate change does not disappear once
we pass those benchmarks—if anything, aggressive and enforceable action
only becomes more vital as the climate emergency continues to worsen
and threaten civilization. Given our current trajectory, however, the next
author proposing climate solutions may better spend her energy focusing
on how to strengthen and maintain stable democracies in unstable times
given the inevitable resource and immigration crises that lie ahead if we
fail to timely act. Let’s hope we don’t get that far.
